We approach the social choice problem as one of optimal statistical inference. If individual voters or judges observe the true order on a set of alternatives with error, then it is possible to use the set of individual rankings to make probability statements about the correct social order. Given the posterior distribution for orders and a suitably chosen loss function, an optimal order is one that minimises expected posterior loss. The paper develops a statistical model describing the behaviour of judges, and discusses Markov chain Monte Carlo estimation. We also discuss criteria for choosing the appropriate loss functions. We apply our methods to a well-known problem: determining the correct ranking for figure skaters competing at the Olympic Games.
Introduction
The question of how best to aggregate individual preferences is one of the oldest and best-known in the social sciences. This issue must be addressed in any setting in which decisions are to be made by social groupings: the election of political leaders and the allocation of communal resources are two of the best-known examples. The ranking of competitors in some judged sports, such as figure skating, presents the same methodological difficulty. It is well known, at least since Condorcet (1785) , that it may be difficult to aggregate individual preferences into a coherent collective order, that is, to avoid cycles. Some two centuries later, Arrow (1963) crystallized this difficulty with his famous Impossibility Theorem, which demonstrates that there is no way S. Gordon · M. Truchon (B) CIRPÉE and Département d'économique, Université Laval, Québec City, QC, Canada, G1K 7P4 e-mail: mtru@ecn.ulaval.ca S. Gordon e-mail: sgor@ecn.ulaval.ca of transforming individual preferences into a coherent social order, while respecting apparently innocuous prescriptions. This result does not imply that the social choice problem is any less relevant-as is testified by the abundant literature that his theorem has spurred.
If individual preferences are arbitrary, the Impossibility Theorem states that there is no way of resolving disagreements. But if we suppose that individuals observe a true social order with error, differences of opinion can be ascribed to random differences in perception. In this case, it should be possible to use individual voters' reported rankings to infer the correct social order. That is, the social choice problem may be thought of as a statistical issue of optimal inference. This approach is as old as the social choice literature itself, and forms the basis for Condorcet's justification of the majority principle. In this, he was certainly inspired by Rousseau (1913) in his Social Contract, for whom the opinion of the majority is legitimate because it expresses the "general will". When in the popular assembly a law is proposed, what the people is asked is not exactly whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the general will, which is their will. Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on that point; and the general will is found by counting votes. When therefore the opinion that is contrary to my own prevails, this proves neither more nor less that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will was not so. (Rousseau 1913, p. 93) Condorcet's rigorous formulation of this proposition is one of the earliest applications of the calculus of probability and of the maximum likelihood approach to inference. He assumed that every voter chooses the best of two alternatives with a probability larger than one half, and that this judgment is independent between pairs and voters. If the binary relation obtained by applying the simple majority rule to each pair of alternatives is an order, then it is the solution to the problem, that is, the most probable order.
Condorcet was perfectly aware that the binary relation resulting from his procedure may contain cycles, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the Condorcet paradox. He proposed a method for breaking these cycles, but unfortunately this method gives consistent results only for the case of three alternatives. Young (1988) shows that a correct application of the maximum likelihood principle leads to the selection of rankings that have the minimal total number of disagreements with those of the voters. In other words, they minimise a "distance" proposed by Kemeny (1959) and for this reason, they are often called Kemeny orders. When it exists, that is, in the absence of cycles in the majority relation, the Condorcet ranking is the unique Kemeny ranking. Drissi-Bakhkhat and Truchon (2004) relax the assumption that the probability of comparing correctly two alternatives is the same for any pair of alternatives. They let the probability increase with the distance between two alternatives in the allegedly true ranking, thus allowing for the possibility that it may be more difficult to correctly rank two competitors who are 'close'. They postulate a two-parameter probability function and they analyze the behaviour of the maximum likelihood rule as a function of these parameters.
We extend the standard Condorcet-Kemeny-Young approach in three ways:
